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Abstract
The European market clearing problem is characterized by a set of heterogeneous orders and rules that force the imple-
mentation of heuristic and iterative solving methods. In particular, curtailable block orders and the uniform purchase price
pose serious difficulties. A block order spans over multiple hours, and can be either fully accepted or fully rejected. The
uniform purchase price prescribes that all consumers pay a common price in all the zones, while producers receive zonal
prices, which can differ from one zone to another.
The market clearing problem in the presence of both the uniform purchase price and block orders is a major open issue
in the European context. The uniform purchase price scheme leads to a non-linear optimization problem involving both
primal and dual variables, whereas block orders introduce multi-temporal constraints and binary variables into the problem.
As a consequence, the market clearing problem in the presence of both block orders and the uniform purchase price can be
regarded as a non-linear integer programming problem involving both primal and dual variables with complementary and
multi-temporal constraints.
The aim of this paper is to present a non-iterative and heuristic-free approach for solving the market clearing problem
in the presence of both curtailable block orders and the uniform purchase price scheme. The solution is exact, with no
approximation up to the level of resolution of current market data. By resorting to an equivalent uniform purchase price
formulation, the proposed approach results in a mixed-integer linear program, which is built starting from a non-linear
integer bilevel programming problem. Numerical results using real market data are reported to show the effectiveness of the
proposed approach. The model has been implemented in Python, and the code is freely available on a public repository.
Keywords: bilevel programming, curtailable block orders, European market clearing, mixed-integer linear programming,
power system economics, uniform purchase price.
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Nomenclature
A. Sets and Indices
i Index of market zones, i ∈ Z.
Kpiti Set of consumers paying the UPP πt in zone i ∈ Z,
with t ∈ T .
Kpit Set of all consumers paying the UPP, i.e., K
pi
t =
∪iK
pi
ti, with t ∈ T .
Kζti Set of consumers paying the zonal price ζti in zone
i ∈ Z, with t ∈ T .
Kζt Set of all consumers paying zonal prices, i.e., K
ζ
t =
∪iK
ζ
ti, with t ∈ T .
Kti Set of all consumers in zone i ∈ Z, i.e.,
Kti = K
pi
ti ∪ K
ζ
ti, with t ∈ T .
Kt Set of all consumers, i.e., Kt = ∪iKti, with t ∈ T .
Pti Set of producers submitting simple stepwise order
in zone i∈ Z, with t∈ T .
Pt Set of all producers submitting simple stepwise or-
der, i.e., Pt = ∪iPti, t ∈ T .
PBi Set of producers submitting curtailable profile block
orders in zone i ∈ Z.
PB Set of all producers submitting curtailable profile
block orders, i.e., PB = ∪iP
B
i .
T Set of the 24 daily hours.
Tp Set of block order p timespan, with p ∈ P
B, and
Tp ⊆ T .
Zpi Set of zones enforcing the UPP πt.
Zζ Set of zones without the UPP, all consumers pay
zonal prices ζti.
Z Set of all zones, Z = Zpi ∪ Zζ.
B. Constants
Dmaxtk Maximum hourly quantity demanded by consumer
k ∈ Kt at time t ∈ T .
Fmaxtij Maximum flow capacity from zone i to zone j with
t ∈ T .
M (.) Mpi, MBp , M
F
tij , and M
D
th are big-M parameters.
Omtk Merit order for consumer k∈ K
pi
t , lower values mean
higher priority.
P dtk Hourly order price submitted by consumer k ∈ Kt
with t ∈ T .
P stp Hourly order price submitted by producer p ∈ Pt
with t ∈ T .
PBp Block order price submitted by producer p ∈ P
B.
Rminp Minimum acceptance ratio for curtailable block or-
der with p ∈ PB.
Smaxtp Maximum hourly quantity offered by producer p ∈
Pt at time t ∈ T .
S
B,max
tp Profile block order maximum hourly quantity of-
fered by producer p ∈ PB with t ∈ Tp.
1. Introduction
Electricity markets are experiencing significant changes
due to different factors, as the modification of generation mix
[1], the increasing presence of demand response [2] and energy
storage systems [3], the growth of renewable energy [4], the
request for both flexibility [5, 6] and security of supply [7],
C. Variables
btji Binary variable used in the binary expansion to con-
vert a positive integer number in binary form, where
i ∈ Zpi, t ∈ T , and j ∈ {0, . . .}.
d
ζ
tk Executed demand quantity for consumer k ∈ K
ζ
t ,
with t ∈ T .
dwtk Executed demand quantity for consumer k ∈ K
pi
t if
uwtk = 1, with t ∈ T .
ddtk Executed demand quantity for consumer k ∈ K
pi
t if
udtk = 1, with t ∈ T .
dpitk Executed demand quantity for consumer k ∈ K
pi
t ,
where dpitk = u
g
tkD
max
tk + d
w
tk + d
d
tk, with k ∈ K
pi
t and
t ∈ T .
ftij Flow from zone i to zone j with t ∈ T .
rp Block order acceptance ratio with p ∈ P
B.
stp Executed supply quantity for producer p ∈ Pt, with
t ∈ T .
u
f
tij Binary variable with i, j ∈ Z
pi and t ∈ T , where
u
f
tij = 1 if and only if the transmission line from i
to j is congested, i.e., ftij = F
max
tij .
uBp Binary variable representing the block order accep-
tance status with p ∈ PB, where uBp = 1 means
accepted, and uBp = 0 rejected.
u
g
tk Binary variable with k ∈ K
pi
t and t ∈ T , where
u
g
tk = 1 ⇐⇒ P
d
tk > π, and zero otherwise.
uetk Binary variable with k ∈ K
pi
t and t ∈ T , where if
uetk = 1 then P
d
tk = π.
uwtk Binary variable with k ∈ K
pi
t and t ∈ T , where if
uwtk = 1 then the demand order is at-the-money and
it is partially cleared according to a social welfare
approach.
udtk Binary variable with k ∈ K
pi
t and t ∈ T , where if
udtk = 1 then the demand order is at-the-money and
it is partially cleared according to an economic dis-
patch approach.
δmaxtij Dual variable of constraint ftij ≤ F
max
tij .
ζti Zonal price in zone i ∈ Z with t ∈ T .
ηtij Dual variable of constraint ftij + ftji = 0.
κt Error tolerance in the uniform purchase price defi-
nition, currently κt ∈ [−1; 5].
ϕ
ζ
tk Dual variable of constraint d
ζ
tk ≤ D
max
tk .
ϕwtk Dual variable of constraint d
w
tk ≤ D
max
tk u
w
tk.
ϕ
w,lo
tk Dual variable of constraint d
w
tk ≥ 0.
ϕstp Dual variable of constraint stp ≤ S
max
tp .
ϕB,maxp Dual variable of constraint rp ≤ u
B
p .
ϕB,minp Dual variable of constraint rp ≥ u
B
p R
min
p .
πt Uniform purchase price at time t ∈ T .
D. Auxiliary Variables
y
gpi
tk Auxiliary variable, it replaces the product u
g
tkπ.
y
gζ
tki Auxiliary variable, it replaces the product u
g
tkζti.
yepitk Auxiliary variable, it replaces the product u
e
tkπt.
y
wϕ
tk Auxiliary variable, it replaces the product u
w
tkϕ
w
tk.
yBϕ,maxp Auxiliary variable, it replaces the product
uBp ϕ
B,max
p .
yBϕ,minp Auxiliary variable, it replaces the product
uBp ϕ
B,min
p .
y
bζ
tij Auxiliary variable, it replaces the product btjiζti.
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and the associated adjustment in power networks [8]. These
changes affected also the European markets. In particular,
the current day-ahead European electricity market is the re-
sult of a merging process that took place during the last three
decades and involved all the main European countries [9], and
it should lead to significant social welfare improvements [10].
However, the complete integration involves several difficul-
ties both in terms of design [11], and interaction between
different markets [12]. In particular, the lack of an original
common design, leads to a European day-ahead electricity
market that is characterized by heterogeneous orders (e.g.,
stepwise orders, piecewise linear orders, simple and linked
block orders [13]), and rules (e.g., minimum income condition
[14], uniform purchase price [15]), which cannot be easily har-
monized. As a consequence, the European market clearing
algorithm [13] deals with a wide variety of issues, due to, for
example, the complexity of both the clearing rules and the or-
ders involved, their heterogeneous nature, and the increasing
number of orders currently submitted to the market, which
forced the implementation of heuristics and iterative solving
methods. One of the most challenging problem is the simul-
taneous presence of block orders and the uniform purchase
pricing scheme. Block orders are present in the central and
northern European countries [16, 17], whereas the uniform
purchase price (UPP) is implemented into the Italian market
[15] with the name of Prezzo Unico Nazionale (PUN).
1.1. The UPP scheme
The UPP scheme requires that all consumers pay a unique
price, termed the UPP, in all the zones, while producers re-
ceive zonal prices, which can differ from one zone to another.
The UPP πt at time t is defined as the average of the zonal
prices ζti, weighted by the consumers’ cleared quantities d
pi
tk.
Formally:
πt =
∑
i∈Zpi
∑
k∈Kpi
ti
ζtid
pi
tk∑
k∈Kpit
dpitk
, (1)
where Zpi is the set of zones enforcing the UPP, Kpiti is the set
of consumers paying the UPP in the zone i at time t ∈ T ,
and Kpit = ∪iK
pi
ti.
Given the UPP definition (1), it is possible to specify the
following UPP clearing rule:
• demand orders with a submitted price P dtk strictly
greater than πt, that is, in-the-money (ITM) demand
orders, must be fully executed, i.e., dpitk = D
max
tk ;
• demand orders with a submitted price P dtk exactly equal
to πt, that is, at-the-money (ATM) demand orders, may
be partially cleared, i.e., 0 ≤ dpitk ≤ D
max
tk ;
• demand orders with a submitted price P dtk strictly lower
than πt, that is, out-of-the-money (OTM) demand or-
ders, must be fully rejected, i.e., dpitk = 0.
In addition, demand orders subject to the UPP scheme are
ranked by a parameter termed merit order, that determines
a strict total ordering between the UPP orders. The merit
order is assigned by the market operator before the day-ahead
auction. Lower merit order Omtk implies a higher priority in
execution. In particular, this ranking coincides with the price
ranking for the orders with different submitted prices, i.e., if
P dth > P
d
tk then O
m
th < O
m
tk, with k, h ∈ K
pi
t . For the orders
with the same price, the merit order is assigned according
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Figure 1: The figure shows a curtailable profile block order (gray +
blue area), which is partially executed (blue area), with acceptance ratio
rp = 0.50.
to a set of non-discriminatory rules, as for example the time
stamp of submission.
Traditionally, pumping units belonging to hydroelectric
production plants are excluded from the UPP rule. These
units buy electricity to refill their reservoirs usually during
the night, whereas they generate energy during the remaining
hours. To harmonize the buying and selling price, demand
orders from these units pay zonal prices, and not the UPP. As
a consequence, the set Kζt of consumers paying zonal prices
is usually non-empty in the set of UPP zones Zpi, because it
is populated by the pumping units. By contrast, the set Kpit
of consumers paying the UPP is always empty in the zones
Zζ non-enforcing the UPP.
Currently, the implementation of the UPP pricing scheme
on the Italian market allows an error tolerance κt ∈ [−1; 5].
Therefore, the Italian PUN is actually defined as:
πt
∑
k∈Kpit
dpitk =
∑
i∈Zpi
∑
k∈Kpi
ti
ζtid
pi
tk + κt . (2)
1.2. Block orders
A block order p submitted by a producer is an order that
spans over multiple hours, and can be either fully accepted
or fully rejected [18]. Moreover, the block order submitted
price PBp must be the same over the whole timespan. The
most general form of a single block order is the profile block
order, which allows to submit different quantities for each
hour. Furthermore, an additional feature called minimum
acceptance ratio (MAR) has been introduced in the Nordic
countries, which allows to partially execute a block order [17].
In this case, the hourly quantities involved can be partially
cleared, and the profile block order is uniformly scaled over
the whole timespan, as depicted in Figure 1. The fraction of
the quantity executed for each hour is termed the acceptance
ratio rp. The acceptance ratio is independent of t, and satis-
fies the constraint, Rminp ≤ rp ≤ 1, where R
min
p is the MAR
for the block order p. For this reason, block orders with MAR
are called curtailable.
Block orders can be classified according to their degree of
moneyness, that is, a block order submitted by a producer is
termed:
• in-the-money (ITM), if the submitted price PBp is smaller
than the average of the zonal prices ζti weighted by
the hourly offered quantities SB,maxtp , or equivalently,
if the block order has a strictly positive surplus, i.e.,∑
t∈Tp
S
B,max
tp (ζti − P
B
p ) > 0;
• at-the-money (ATM), if the submitted price PBp is equal
to the average of the zonal prices ζti weighted by the
hourly offered quantities SB,maxtp , or equivalently, if the
c©2018. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license
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block order has a zero surplus, i.e.,
∑
t∈Tp
S
B,max
tp (ζti −
PBp ) = 0;
• out-of-the-money (OTM), if the submitted price PBp is
greater than the average of the zonal prices ζti weighted
by the hourly offered quantities SB,maxtp , or equivalently,
if the block order has a strictly negative surplus, i.e.,∑
t∈Tp
S
B,max
tp (ζti − P
B
p ) < 0;
where Tp ⊆ T is the timespan of block order p. We recall
that the acceptance ratio rp does not depend on time. For
this reason, in the definitions of the block order surplus only
S
B,max
tp is considered instead of rpS
B,max
tp . ITM block orders
should be fully executed. ATM block orders can be partially
cleared. OTM block orders must be always rejected. No-
tice that, the indivisible nature of regular block orders may
prevent the existence of an optimal market equilibrium, i.e.,
the clearing problem may result infeasible [19, 20]. For this
reason, current market rules allow to reject ITM block or-
ders [13]. Rejected ITM block orders are termed paradoxi-
cally rejected block orders (PRBs). By contrast, OTM block
orders that are accepted are termed paradoxically accepted
block orders (PABs). PABs are not allowed in the European
markets. The reasoning behind this different treatment is
straightforward. Under perfect competition, prices submit-
ted by producers are the marginal costs [21, 22]. Therefore,
a PAB would cause a monetary loss to the producer, whereas
a PRB leads to a missed trading opportunity. Notice that,
in some US markets [23] and in Turkey [24], it is possible
to compensate producers with side payments [25], but this is
not allowed in the European markets.
1.3. Literature review
In the literature, algorithms to solve the market clearing
problem in the presence of block orders are based on dif-
ferent techniques. Reference [26] formulates a mixed-integer
linear program (MILP) to clear the market with an addi-
tional iterative process to handle PRBs. Reference [27] pro-
poses a primal-dual formulation of the market clearing prob-
lem, where an improved Benders-like decomposition method
is further introduced to strengthen the classical Benders cuts,
which is extended in [28]. In [19] a clearing method to min-
imize the impact of PRBs on the final solution is proposed.
Reference [29] introduces a bilevel approach to handle regu-
lar block orders in a single-zone market where block order
surpluses are explicitly considered. The official European
algorithm for market coupling, termed EUPHEMIA [13], is
based on a mixed-integer quadratic programming formula-
tion with additional sequential subproblems and modules.
It is partially derived from the COSMOS [30] model, orig-
inally employed in the central-western European electricity
markets. Both algorithms implement a branch-and-bound
method for solving a European social welfare maximization
problem, where appropriate cuts are introduced until an opti-
mal solution fulfilling all the market requirements is achieved.
Reference [31] reports an interesting scenario analysis, which
investigates the effects of different size, number and type of
block orders on the computation time required to solve the
market clearing problem. Reference [32] formulates a mixed-
integer quadratic program to mimic the complete European
day-ahead market, with iterative processes to handle PRBs,
complex orders, and the UPP.
With respect to the UPP scheme, reference [33] proposes a
complementarity approach to solve a clearing problem un-
der mixed pricing rules, which is further extended to re-
serves in [34], and block orders in [35]. In the latter case,
an iterative process is implemented which involves an ini-
tial MILP problem to handle block orders, followed by a
mixed-complementarity problem to deal with the UPP. Refer-
ence [36] uses a complementarity approach to clear a market
with block and complex orders, which is extended to UPP
in [37], where in both cases a heuristic process is used to
handle paradoxical orders. Reference [38] proposes a bilevel
model to clear a UPP market with simple stepwise orders,
where the objective function maximize the surplus of the con-
sumers. Reference [39] proposes an income based approach to
overcome the non-linearities of the UPP, however this model
cannot be extended to curtailable block orders. Originally,
the method to clear the Italian market was based on [40],
whereas the current approach implemented by EUPHEMIA
is described in [13]. In the first case, the UPP is sequentially
selected among each possible price in the aggregate market
demand curve until the whole curve is explored. Then, the
optimal solution is chosen among the feasible candidates that
clear the market and yield the greatest social welfare. Sim-
ilarly, EUPHEMIA explores the aggregate market demand
curve until a feasible solution is found that clears the market
while satisfying the UPP definition (2) within the error tol-
erance κt. Notice that the UPP scheme differs substantially
from both the consumers payment minimization scheme [41]
(where the objective is to minimize the total consumers’ pay-
ments), and from the clearing rule used in some US markets,
such as [42], where the common price paid by consumers is
computed by using an ex-post iteration. Finally, reference
[43] reports an interesting analysis of the European market
coupling impact on the UPP, where the positive effect of the
increased market liquidity has been assessed.
1.4. Market clearing issues in the presence of block orders
and UPP
Block orders and the UPP rule pose a considerable bur-
den on the European market clearing problem. In partic-
ular, block orders introduce at least two kinds of relevant
issues. Firstly, the indivisible nature of these orders forces
the introduction of binary variables. Secondly, block orders
span over multiple trading hours, and impose multi-temporal
constraints. On the other hand, under the UPP scheme it
is not possible to use directly the traditional social welfare
maximization method to clear the market, due to the pos-
sible difference in the price paid by consumers (the UPP)
and the price received by producers (the zonal price) within
the same zone. Moreover, the UPP scheme requires to clear
consumers and producers simultaneously, because both have
price-elastic curves, i.e., the demanded and offered quantities
depend on the actual market prices. Furthermore, under the
marginal pricing framework [44, 45], market prices are defined
as the dual variables of the power balance constraints. This
means that the problem formulation must involve the dual
variables. Finally, the UPP definition (1) implies the pres-
ence of bilinear terms involving both quantities and prices,
i.e., primal and dual variables, which make the problem non-
linear and non-convex. As a consequence, the European mar-
ket clearing problem with both block orders and the UPP can
be regarded as a non-linear integer program, involving both
primal and dual variables with complementary and multi-
temporal constraints.
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1.5. Paper contribution
The problem of finding a computationally tractable and ex-
act social welfare maximization formulation, for solving the
market clearing problem in the presence of both block orders
and the UPP scheme, is an important open issue in the Euro-
pean context. The purpose of this paper is to present a non-
iterative solution to this problem, which results in a MILP
model, that can be solved with off-the-shelf solvers. This
model is obtained starting from a non-linear integer bilevel
problem, which is transformed into an equivalent single level
model by using primal-dual relations and properties. Then,
all the non-linearities are removed by using both standard
integer algebra and an equivalent reformulation of the UPP
definition. We remark that, this approach is homogeneous
in spite of the different traded instruments and market rules.
That is, the proposed framework deals with both block or-
ders and the UPP by using the same comprehensive model
under the exact European social welfare maximization objec-
tive, with no iterative process or subproblems. Furthermore,
by construction, market prices are guaranteed to fulfill the
marginal pricing scheme [44] as required by the European reg-
ulatory framework [46] and coherently with standard market
practices [13, 14]. The solution is exact, with no approxima-
tion at least up to the level of resolution of current market
data. Finally, the MILP formulation allows to prove the op-
timality of the solution. To summarize, the main novelties
presented in this work are:
1. the exact formulation of the market clearing problem in
the presence of both curtailable profile block orders and
the UPP as a non-linear integer bilevel problem, which
is then transformed into an equivalent MILP model;
2. the use of complementary relations and integer methods
to linearize the UPP definition;
3. the non-iterative approach maximizing the exact social
welfare in the presence of both the UPP and curtailable
block orders.
The aim of this work is to show that the UPP scheme (i.e.,
a non-linear program), and block orders (which involve bi-
nary variables), that are currently handled heuristically, can
be recast as a single, all-encompassing MILP problem, fulfill-
ing all the European regulatory requirements. This flexible
approach allows one to gain knowledge on the overall clearing
problem. By providing insights into the problem structure,
the model can be used by transmission system operators,
policy makers and stakeholders to evaluate the physical and
economic impacts of both grid expansion plans and modifi-
cations to market policies and rules, by carrying out what-if
analysis on specific elements reflected in the problem objec-
tive and constraints. In this respect, we freely provide the
open-source Python code of the proposed model, in order to
bridge the gap between modeling and implementation, and
to offer a ready-to-use tool to the interested user. Finally,
we recall that the MILP formulation allows one to certify the
optimality of the obtained solution.
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 highlights some of the clearing differences between
the UPP scheme and a traditional market. Section 3 presents
a formulation of the non-linear integer bilevel model, and
shows how the final MILP is built. Section 4 illustrates some
optional modeling features to detect market splits. Section
5 describes the tests performed, and reports the numerical
results. Finally, Section 6 outlines some conclusions. The
complete MILP model is reported in Appendix A.
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Figure 2: Market clearing without the UPP rule. The intersection of
the demand and supply curves determines both the zonal price and the
cleared quantities. The demand order labeled by A is an at-the-money
order, and it is partially cleared. By contrast, the demand order labeled
by B is an out-of-the-money order, and must be rejected.
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Figure 3: Market clearing with the UPP rule. The UPP is assumed
to be 5 Euro/MWh. The demand order labeled by A has a price of
15 Euro/MWh, whereas demand order labeled by B has a price of 5
Euro/Mwh. According to the UPP rule, the order A is in-the-money
and must be fully executed. By contrast, the order B is at-the-money
and can be partially cleared.
With respect to [38], curtailable profile block orders are
now considered (both in UPP and non-UPP zones), a novel
and equivalent UPP formulation is proposed, and the objec-
tive function represents the exact social welfare.
2. Market clearing differences between the UPP
scheme and a traditional European market
This section provides a few examples to highlight some
of the clearing differences between the UPP scheme and a
traditional European market. For ease of reading, this section
considers only stepwise orders.
In a traditional European market, i.e., a market cleared ac-
cording to a social welfare approach with no UPP involved,
the intersection of the supply and the demand curves deter-
mines both the quantity executed and the zonal price, as
depicted in Figure 2. In this case, the demand and supply
orders are cleared at the same price, i.e., the zonal price.
In particular, a demand order is in-the-money if its price is
strictly greater than the zonal price, whereas it is at-the-
money if its price is exactly equal to the zonal price, and
it is out-of-the-money if its price is strictly lower than the
zonal price. In Figure 2, the demand order labeled by A is
intersected by the supply curve, the intersection determines
the quantity partially executed, and the price of the order A
sets the zonal price in the zone. [21, 22]. The order A is an
at-the-money order. By contrast, the demand order labeled
by B is out-of-the-money, because its price is strictly lower
than the zonal price, and it must be fully rejected. This is
not necessarily true for a UPP demand order, because it is
cleared at the UPP and not at the zonal price.
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Figure 4: Solution of the market clearing problem depicted in Figure 3.
The UPP is assumed to be 5 Euro/MWh. The total demanded quantity
includes the quantity dd
tk
partially cleared. The zonal price ζti, collected
by the producers, is determined as the price required to dispatch the
demanded quantity.
Figure 3 shows the same demand and supply curves as in
Figure 2. However, in this example the UPP rule is enforced,
and the UPP is assumed equal to 5 Euro/MWh. Here, all
the demand orders are cleared at the UPP and not at the
zonal price. Therefore, the demand order labeled by A is
in-the-money and must be fully executed, whereas the de-
mand order labeled by B is at-the-money and can be partially
cleared. Notice that, the order labeled by B can be partially
executed regardless of the zonal price in the zone. This is a
fundamental difference with respect to a traditional market.
In the case depicted in Figure 3, the in-the-money demand
orders and the quantity partially cleared of the order B must
be executed. Therefore, the problem boils down to finding the
exact executed quantity and the zonal price, given the UPP.
We recall that producers collect zonal prices. Therefore, the
problem to solve is to find the price required by producers to
match the demanded quantity. This problem is an economic
dispatch of a potentially variable demand (which in turn de-
pends on the UPP). In a dispatch problem, the demand is
a constant, and the demand curve is considered as if it were
inelastic, i.e., a vertical line, and the intersection with the
supply curve determines the price required by producers, as
depicted in Figure 4. In this case, the demand includes the
quantity partially cleared ddtk. The zonal price ζti is the prices
required by the producers to match the demanded quantity.
An important consequence of the UPP pricing scheme is that
it is possible to have, in the same zone, an at-the-money UPP
demand order and a supply order with two different prices,
both partially cleared, as in Figure 4. This is not possible in
a traditional market as the one depicted in Figure 2, and it
is an additional issue of the UPP pricing scheme.
In particular cases, the market equilibrium given by the
intersection of the demand and supply curves satisfies also
the UPP rule, as shown in Figure 5. In this figure, the UPP
is assumed to be 15 Euro/MWh. The demand order labeled
by A has a price of 15 Euro/MWh, it is therefore at-the-
money, and can be partially executed. This order is inter-
sected by the supply curve. The quantity partially cleared
and the zonal price determined by the intersection, as in a
traditional market, fulfills also the UPP rule, because all the
in-the-money UPP orders are fully executed, whereas the or-
der partially cleared A is at-the-money. As a consequence, in
this particular case, the zonal price, the UPP and the price of
the demand order A coincide, i.e., P dtk = πt = ζti. Both the
cases depicted in Figure 4, and Figure 5 will be considered.
The first case allows a UPP demand order to be partially
executed regardless of the zonal price, by relying on a dis-
patch approach. The second one is a special case, where we
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
0
5
10
15
20
25
Demand Supply
B
pitA
Quantity (MWh)
Figure 5: Market clearing with the UPP rule. The UPP is assumed to
be 15 Euro/MWh. This figure depicts a special case where the market
equilibrium given by the intersection of the supply and demand curves,
as in a traditional market, respects also the UPP rule. The demand
order labeled by A is partially executed, whereas the order B must be
rejected.
will exploit the elasticity of the demand curve and the tra-
ditional social welfare approach to deal efficiently with these
at-the-money UPP orders, as shown in Section 3.4.
3. The Model
This section presents a formalization of the market clearing
problem in the presence of both the UPP and curtailable pro-
file block orders as a non-linear integer bilevel model. Then,
it shows how the bilevel model can be transformed into an
equivalent MILP problem.
3.1. Bilevel programming
A bilevel model can be regarded as two nested optimiza-
tion problems, termed upper and lower level problems [47].
Formally, a bilevel model is defined as:
max
u∈U
F (u, x∗) (3)
s.t. x∗ = argmax
x∈X
f(x;u) , (4)
where F and f are the upper and lower level objective func-
tions, respectively. The main feature of a bilevel program
is that the upper level decision variables, labeled u in (3)-
(4), enter the lower level as fixed parameters. The variables
x∗ represent the optimal solution of the lower level problem,
which depends on the upper level variables u, i.e., x∗= x∗(u).
However, for ease of reading this dependence is usually not
formally expressed. Historically, the bilevel approach was
used in the field of game theory to describe non-cooperative
Stackelberg games [47]. In a Stackelberg game the upper
level problem represents a leader that acts before a follower,
that is represented by the lower level problem. However, in
power system economics, the bilevel method is typically used
to access the dual variables, i.e., the market prices, and not
to actually build a game. Therefore, the upper and the lower
level objective functions, i.e., F and f , are usually equiva-
lent. The interested reader is referred to [47, 48, 49] for addi-
tional information on bilevel programs and their applications
in power system economics.
3.2. The non-linear integer bilevel model
In the proposed approach, the upper level problem han-
dles the UPP and verifies the degree of moneyness of block
orders, whereas the lower level actually clears the market by
using a social welfare maximization approach while properly
dispatching the UPP orders, as outlined in Fig.6.
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degree of
moneyness
cleared
quantities,
market prices
Lower Level
• Objective
Max social welfare
• Purpose
Market clearing and
dispatch of UPP orders
Upper Level
• Objective
Max social welfare
• Purpose
Check of degree of moneyness
Enforcing merit orders
UPP computation
Figure 6: An overview of the proposed bilevel model. The upper level
handles the UPP and determines the orders’ degree of moneyness. The
lower level clears the market while dispatching UPP orders depending
on the UPP rule.
3.2.1. The upper level problem
This section describes the upper level problem, which is
defined as follows:
max
u
g
tk
,uetk,u
w
tk,
udtk,u
B
p ,pit,
dpitk,d
d
tk,κt.
∑
t∈T
∑
k∈K
ζ
t
P dtkd
ζ
tk
∗
+
∑
t∈T
∑
k∈Kpit
P dtkd
pi
tk
−
∑
t∈T
∑
p∈Pt
P stps
∗
tp −
∑
p∈PB
∑
t∈Tp
PBp r
∗
pS
B,max
tp (5)
subject to:
πt
∑
k∈Kpit
dpitk =
∑
i∈Zpi
∑
k∈Kpi
ti
ζ∗tid
pi
tk + κt ∀t ∈ T (6)
P dtk − πt ≤M
piu
g
tk ∀t ∈ T , ∀k ∈ K
pi
t
(7)
P dtk − πt ≥ ǫ−M
pi(1− ugtk) ∀t ∈ T , ∀k ∈ K
pi
t
(8)
uetk(P
d
tk − πt) = 0 ∀t ∈ T , ∀k ∈ K
pi
t
(9)
u
g
th ≥ u
g
tk ∀t ∈ T , ∀h, k ∈ K
pi
t : O
m
th < O
m
tk (10)
dpitk = u
g
tkD
max
tk + d
w
tk
∗ + ddtk ∀t ∈ T , ∀k ∈ K
pi
t(11)∑
t∈Tp
S
B,max
tp (ζ
∗
ti − P
B
p ) ≥ −M
B
p (1 − u
B
p )∀i ∈ Z, ∀p ∈ P
B
i (12)
uwtk + u
d
tk ≤ u
e
tk ∀t ∈ T , ∀k ∈ K
pi
t
(13)
ddtk ≤ D
max
tk u
d
tk ∀t ∈ T , ∀k ∈ K
pi
t
(14)
u
g
tk ∈ {0, 1} , u
e
tk ∈ {0, 1} ∀t ∈ T , ∀k ∈ K
pi
t(15)
uwtk ∈ {0, 1} , u
d
tk ∈ {0, 1} ∀t ∈ T , ∀k ∈ K
pi
t(16)
uBp ∈ {0, 1} ∀p ∈ P
B , (17)
with dpitk ≥ 0, d
d
tk ≥ 0, κt ∈ [−1; 5], and πt ∈ R. The term ǫ
is a sufficiently small positive parameter, whereas Mpi, and
MBp are appropriate large constants, and a discussion on the
selection of these parameters is given in Appendix A. Notice
that, the starred variables dζtk
∗
, dwtk
∗, s∗tp, ζ
∗
ti, and r
∗
p, are the
optimal values of the lower level variables, as sketched in (3)-
(4). The upper level is a social welfare maximization prob-
lem where the first two terms in the objective function (5)
represent the demand orders, the third term represents pro-
ducers submitting simple stepwise orders, and the last term
represents producers submitting curtailable profile block or-
ders. Constraint (6) is the UPP definition stated in (2). Con-
straints (7)-(8) imply that the binary variable ugtk is equal to
one if and only if the submitted price P dtk is strictly greater
than the UPP πt. Whereas, constraint (9) implies that the
binary variable uetk can be equal to one only if the submitted
price P dtk is exactly equal to the UPP πt. Notice that, u
g
tk
and uetk cannot be equal to one at the same time. Constraint
(10) enforces the priority due to the merit orders, i.e., it de-
termines the sequential execution of the in-the-money UPP
demand orders within the UPP zones, with a significant re-
duction in the search space of the binary variables. In this
constraint, h and k are indices representing all the consumers
paying the UPP, that is h, k ∈ Kpit . If the order of consumer h
has a smaller merit order than the order of consumer k (i.e.,
Omth < O
m
tk), then the order of consumer h must be executed
before the order of consumer k. Notice that merit orders are
inputs, therefore constraint (10) is linear. Equation (11) de-
fines the auxiliary variables dpitk, which are used to recap the
executed quantities for UPP demand orders into single vari-
ables. Constraint (12) verifies the degree of moneyness for
block orders, and implies that the binary variables uBp can be
equal to one only if the block order has a non-negative sur-
plus. That is, if the block order is accepted, i.e., uBp = 1, then
the block order must be either ITM or ATM. By contrast,
a block order can be rejected, i.e., uBp = 0, regardless of the
surplus. Therefore, this formulation excludes any PAB, i.e.,
an OTM block order which is accepted, but it allows PRBs,
i.e., ITM block orders which are rejected, consistently with
the European market requirements, as described in Section
1.2. The constraint (13) defines the binary variables uwtk and
udtk. These variables can differ from zero only if u
e
tk = 1,
i.e., if the UPP demand order is at-the-money, which is the
requirement for having a UPP order partially executed. The
variables uwtk handle the case of partial execution according to
a traditional social welfare approach, as depicted in Figure 5,
whereas the variables udtk handle the case of partial execution
according to an economic dispatch approach, as depicted in
Figure 4. The constraint (13) prevents the double execution
of the same order. Finally, the constraint (14) sets the limit
on the maximum dispatchable quantity ddtk. Given the up-
per level decision variables ugtk, u
w
tk, d
d
tk, and u
B
p the market
clearing is actually performed by the lower level problem.
3.2.2. The lower level problem
This section describes the lower level problem, which is
defined as follows:
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(
d
ζ
tk
∗, dwtk
∗
, s∗tp, r
∗
p, f
∗
tij , [ζ
∗
ti]
)
=
arg max
d
ζ
tk
,dwtk,stp,
rp,ftij .
∑
t∈T
∑
k∈K
ζ
t
P dtkd
ζ
tk +
∑
t∈T
∑
k∈Kpit
P dtkd
w
tk
−
∑
t∈T
∑
p∈Pt
P stpstp −
∑
p∈PB
∑
t∈Tp
PBp rpS
B,max
tp (18)
subject to:
dwtk ≤ u
w
tkD
max
tk [ϕ
w
tk ≥ 0] ∀t ∈ T , ∀k ∈ K
pi
t (19)
− dwtk ≤ 0 [ϕ
w,lo
tk ≥ 0] ∀t ∈ T , ∀k ∈ K
pi
t (20)
d
ζ
tk ≤ D
max
tk [ϕ
ζ
tk ≥ 0] ∀t ∈ T , ∀k ∈ K
ζ
t (21)
stp ≤ S
max
tp [ϕ
s
tp ≥ 0] ∀t ∈ T , ∀p ∈ Pt (22)
ftij ≤ F
max
tij [δ
max
tij ≥ 0] ∀t ∈ T , ∀i, j ∈ Z (23)
ftij + ftji = 0 [ηtij ∈ R] ∀t ∈ T , ∀i, j ∈ Z (24)
rp ≤ u
B
p [ϕ
B,max
p ≥ 0] ∀p ∈ P
B (25)
− rp ≤ −u
B
p R
min
p [ϕ
B,min
p ≥ 0] ∀p ∈ P
B (26)
∑
k∈K
ζ
ti
d
ζ
tk +
∑
k∈Kpi
ti
dwtk −
∑
p∈Pti
stp +
∑
j∈Z
ftij −
∑
p∈PB
i
rpS
B,max
tp =
−
∑
k∈Kpi
ti
u
g
tkD
max
tk −
∑
k∈Kpi
ti
ddtk [ζti ∈ R] ∀t ∈ T , ∀i ∈ Z,(27)
with dζtk ≥ 0, d
w
tk ∈ R, stp≥ 0, rp ∈ R, and ftij ∈ R. Dual
variables are enclosed in square brackets. Given the upper
level variables ugtk, u
w
tk, d
d
tk, and u
B
p , the lower level problem
actually clears the market while dispatching the UPP order
according to their degree of moneyness. We recall that the
upper level variables enter the lower level as parameters,
therefore the lower level problem is a linear program. Notice
that, the lower level objective function (18) is equivalent
to the upper level objective function (5). Indeed, if we
substitute (11) into (5) and considering that the terms
P dtku
g
tkD
max
tk and P
d
tkd
d
tk are constants into the lower level
problem, and that any constant term can be removed
from an objective function without altering the optimal
solution, we obtain the equivalent lower level objective
function (18). Therefore, given the upper level variables, the
lower level clears the market according to an exact social
welfare maximization problem. Constraints (19)-(22) impose
bounds on the demanded and offered quantities. Notice
that, the constraints (20) explicitly sets the lower bound
for the demanded quantities dwtk. This formulation will
be exploited in Section 3.4. Constraints (23)-(24) impose
bounds on the inter-zonal flows. Constraints (25)-(26)
set the MAR conditions for block orders by enforcing the
relation Rminp ≤ rp≤ 1. The binary variables u
B
p are used
to exclude any out-of-the-money block orders as determined
by (12). We recall that, the acceptance ratio rp must be
the same during all the hours t ∈ Tp. This means that
the day-ahead clearing problem in the presence of block
orders cannot be split in independent hourly subproblems.
Finally, equation (27) defines the power balance constraint
for each zone i∈ Z = Zpi ∪ Zζ . The right-hand-side of
(27) specifies the quantities that must be dispatched. In
particular, the terms ugtkD
max
tk represent the in-the-money
orders that must be fully executed and dispatched according
to the UPP clearing rule (see Section 1.1). By contrast, the
terms ddtk represent the at-the-money UPP orders partially
executed and to dispatch (as in case depicted in Figure 4),
where the quantity ddtk is determined by the upper level.
Furthermore, notice the presence of dwtk in the left-hand-side
of (27). The variable dwtk is a lower level decision variable,
which determines the quantity partially cleared for an
at-the-money UPP order by using a social welfare approach,
as in the special cases depicted in Figure 5. The constraint
(13) prevents the double clearing of the same order. Notice
further that the set Kpiti, i.e., the consumers paying the
UPP, is empty in the zones non-enforcing the UPP, that is,
Kpiti= Ø if i∈ Z
ζ .
The starred variables dζtk
∗, dwtk
∗, s∗tp, r
∗
p, f
∗
tij , and ζ
∗
ti rep-
resent the optimal values of the lower level variables. The
zonal prices ζti are defined as the dual variables of the power
balance constraints (27), as required by the marginal pricing
framework [44, 45]. The zonal prices are used within the up-
per level problem to compute the UPP in equation (6) and
to verify the degree of moneyness for block orders in the con-
straint (12). In the following section, the bilevel program is
reduced to a single level optimization problem.
3.3. The equivalent single level problem
In order to access the dual variables ζti, i.e., the zonal
prices, the bilevel model formalized in Section 3.2 is refor-
mulated as an equivalent single level optimization problem.
The objective function of the single level problem is the
same of the objective function of the upper level (5), i.e.:
max
u
g
tk
,uetk,u
w
tk,u
d
tk,u
B
p ,
pit,d
pi
tk,d
ζ
tk
,dwtk,d
d
tk,
stp,κt,rp,ftij ,ζti,
ϕ
ζ
tk
,ϕwtk,ϕ
w,lo
tk
,ϕstp,ηtij ,
ϕB,maxp ,ϕ
B,min
p ,δ
max
tij .
∑
t∈T
∑
k∈K
ζ
t
P dtkd
ζ
tk +
∑
t∈T
∑
k∈Kpit
P dtkd
pi
tk
−
∑
t∈T
∑
p∈Pt
P stpstp
−
∑
p∈PB
∑
t∈Tp
PBp rpS
B,max
tp . (28)
The single level problem is a unique optimization pro-
gram, and there is no distinction between upper and
lower parts. Hence, all the decision variables of both the
problems are present in (28). Furthermore, we recall that
the lower level problem is a linear program, because all
the upper level variables enter the lower level as parame-
ters. As a linear program, the lower level is equivalent to
its necessary and sufficient Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT)
conditions. Moreover, in a linear program, the KKT
complementary slackness is equivalent to the strong duality
property [48, 50, 51]. As a consequence, the lower level
problem can be introduced into the single level prob-
lem by adding the following constraints to the single level:
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∑
t∈T
∑
k∈K
ζ
t
P dtkd
ζ
tk +
∑
t∈T
∑
k∈Kpit
P dtkd
w
tk
−
∑
k∈Kt
∑
p∈Pt
P stpstp −
∑
p∈PB
∑
t∈Tp
PBp rpS
B,max
tp
=
∑
t∈T
∑
k∈Kpit
uwtkϕ
w
tkD
max
tk +
∑
t∈T
∑
k∈K
ζ
t
ϕ
ζ
tkD
max
tk +
∑
t∈T
∑
p∈Pt
ϕstpS
max
tp
+
∑
t∈T
∑
i∈Z
∑
j∈Z
δmaxtij F
max
tij −
∑
t∈T
∑
i∈Zpi
ζti
∑
k∈Kpi
ti
(ugtkD
max
tk + d
d
tk)
+
∑
p∈PB
ϕB,maxp u
B
p −
∑
p∈PB
ϕB,minp u
B
p R
min
p (29)
ϕwtk − ϕ
w,lo
tk + ζti = P
d
tk ∀t ∈ T , ∀i ∈ Z, ∀k ∈ K
pi
ti (30)
ϕ
ζ
tk + ζti ≥ P
d
tk ∀t ∈ T , ∀i ∈ Z, ∀k ∈ K
ζ
ti (31)
ϕstp − ζti ≥ −P
s
tp ∀t ∈ T , ∀i ∈ Z, ∀p ∈ Pti (32)
δmaxtij + ηtij + ηtji + ζti = 0 ∀t ∈ T , ∀i, j ∈ Z (33)
ϕB,maxp − ϕ
B,min
p −
∑
t∈Tp
ζtiS
B,max
tp
= −
∑
t∈Tp
PBp S
B,max
tp ∀i ∈ Z, ∀p ∈ P
B
i (34)
(19)-(27) , (35)
where (29) is the strong duality property, which requires
the equivalence between the objective functions’ values in
both the primal problem and the dual problem. Conditions
(30)-(34) are the constraints of the dual problem, i.e., the
dual feasibility, whereas (35) refers to the original constraints
of the lower level problem, i.e., the primal feasibility.
To summarize, the single level optimization problem,
equivalent to the bilevel model presented in section 3.2, is
composed by the following three parts:
1. the objective function (28);
2. the constraints of the upper level (6)-(17);
3. the conditions representing the lower level problem (29)-
(35).
3.4. The final MILP model
The single level optimization problem presented in Section
3.3 is a non-linear integer program. To obtain the final equiv-
alent MILP model, all the non-linearities must be removed.
There are three kinds of non-linearities in the single level:
1. the products of a binary variable and a continuous
bounded variable, as uetkπt in (9);
2. the product πtd
pi
tk in the UPP definition (6);
3. the product ζti
∑
k∈Kpi
ti
ddtk in the strong duality (29), and
in (6) due to (11).
The non-linearities due to the product of a binary and a
continuous bounded variable can be removed by using stan-
dard integer algebra. As an example, the product ux of the
binary variable u, and the continuous variable x with bounds
±M , can be replaced by an auxiliary continuous bounded
variable y defined as:
−Mu ≤ y ≤ +Mu (36)
−M(1− u) ≤ x− y ≤ +M(1− u) . (37)
The Appendix A reports all the auxiliary variables actually
used, with a discussion on the selection of the big-M’s values.
To handle the UPP definition (6), we propose a novel and
equivalent formulation. Firstly, by using (11), the UPP defi-
nition (6) can be written as:
∑
k∈Kpit
πtu
g
tkD
max
tk +
∑
k∈Kpit
πtd
w
tk +
∑
k∈Kpit
πtd
d
tk
=
∑
i∈Zpi
∑
k∈Kpi
ti
ζtiu
g
tkD
max
tk +
∑
i∈Zpi
∑
k∈Kpi
ti
ζtid
w
tk
+
∑
i∈Zpi
∑
k∈Kpi
ti
ζtid
d
tk + κt ∀t ∈ T . (38)
In (38), the terms πtu
g
tkD
max
tk and ζtiu
g
tkD
max
tk involve the
products of a binary variable and a continuous variable, and
can be handled as shown in (36)-(37). Furthermore, due to
(9) and (13), the terms dwtk and d
d
tk refers to at-the-money
UPP orders, where πt = P
d
tk, by definition. As a consequence,
the terms πtd
w
tk and πtd
d
tk in (38) can be replaced by P
d
tkd
w
tk
and P dtkd
d
tk, respectively.
The term ζtid
w
tk in (38) is handled as follows. Firstly, by
using (30) the zonal prices is recast as:
ζti = P
d
tk − ϕ
w
tk + ϕ
w,lo
tk , (39)
therefore, ζtid
w
tk becomes:
dwtkP
d
tk − d
w
tkϕ
w
tk + d
w
tkϕ
w,lo
tk . (40)
Then, we recall that to obtain the single level problem in
Section 3.3, the lower level has been recast by using a set of
equivalent necessary and sufficient conditions, and to avoid
the KKT complementary slackness, the strong duality prop-
erty has been used. This is desirable because the KKT com-
plementary slackness would introduce further non-linearities.
However, the strong duality guarantees that all the KKT
complementary slackness conditions hold [52, 53]. Therefore,
we can use any subset of them for our purpose. In particular,
the complementary slackness associated to the constraints
(19)-(20) are defined as follows:
(dwtk − u
w
tkD
max
tk )ϕ
w
tk = 0 ⇐⇒ d
w
tkϕ
w
tk = u
w
tkD
max
tk ϕ
w
tk (41)
− dwtkϕ
w,lo
tk = 0 . (42)
Hence, by using (40)-(42) the following relation can be ob-
tained:
ζtid
w
tk = d
w
tkP
d
tk − u
w
tkD
max
tk ϕ
w
tk , (43)
which involves only the product of a binary and a continuous
variable, and can be handled as showed in (36)-(37).
Finally, the only remaining non-linearity to handle is the
term ζti
∑
k∈Kpi
ti
ddtk which is present not only in (38) but also
in (29). To deal with this term we use a binary expansion.
The basic idea of a binary expansion is to convert an integer
number in binary form by using binary variables [54, 55, 56].
In particular, the binary expansion is utilized to convert the
quantity
∑
k∈Kpi
ti
ddtk in binary form, as follows:
J∑
j=0
btji2
j = 10c
∑
k∈Kpi
ti
ddtk ∀t ∈ T , ∀i ∈ Z
pi , (44)
where btji ∈ {0, 1}, J is an appropriate parameter depending
on the market data, and c is the number of decimal digits al-
lowed in the considered market. In the Italian market c= 3.
The right-hand-side in (44) represents the term under con-
version, where the value
∑
k∈Kpi
ti
ddtk is multiplied by 10
c in
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order to obtain an integer number. Then, the left-hand-side
actually performs the conversion in binary form. Given the
value of c, which depends on the market specifications, the
discretization performed in (44) is exact. As a consequence
the following relation holds:
ζti
∑
k∈Kpi
ti
ddtk = 10
−cζti
J∑
j=0
btji2
j . (45)
Therefore, substituting the terms described, and simpli-
fying the common terms, the UPP definition (38), can be
equivalently recast as:
∑
k∈Kpit
πtu
g
tkD
max
tk +
∑
k∈Kpit
P dtkd
d
tk
=
∑
i∈Zpi
∑
k∈Kpi
ti
ζtiu
g
tkD
max
tk −
∑
k∈Kpit
uwtkD
max
tk ϕ
w
tk
+ 10−c
∑
i∈Zpi
ζti
J∑
j=0
btji2
j + κt ∀t ∈ T , (46)
which involves only the products of a binary and a continuous
variable that can be handled as showed in (36)-(37). The
definition (46) is exact, with no approximation provided that
the parameter c, introduced in (44), is selected properly.
Starting from the single level model described in Section
3.3, by using (46) in place of (6), substituting (45) in (29),
and after removing all the non-linearities due to the products
of a binary and a continuous variable as outlined in (36)-(37),
we obtain the final MILP model reported in Appendix A.
The MILP model solves the market clearing problem in the
presence of both the UPP and curtailable profile block or-
ders by using an exact social welfare maximization approach
without any heuristic or iterative methods.
4. Implementation details
Under the UPP pricing scheme, all the UPP orders have
a merit order, i.e., a parameter that determines a strict to-
tal ordering among the orders, as described in Section 1.1.
All the UPP orders must be executed sequentially, accord-
ing to the priority established by the merit order. However,
the current implementation of the UPP pricing scheme in
the European market, strictly enforces the merit order only
for the in-the-money UPP orders, see (10). By contrast, the
merit order for the ATM UPP orders is enforced only as long
as there is enough transmission capacity between the zones
involved, i.e., if there is no market split. For this reason, the
merit order for ATM orders is currently enforced ex-post,
given the market solution. In this section, we propose a set
of constraints to detect whether the connecting lines are con-
gested or not. In particular, we introduce a set of conditions
to detect market splits, and to enforce the merit order for
the ATM UPP orders directly within the optimization prob-
lem. These constraints are upper level constraints. However,
they are not strictly required by the current European mar-
ket rules. For this reason, they are described in this section
and not in Section 3.2. Notice that, these constraints allow
one to fix a significant part of the ATM quantities actually
executed, with a significant reduction of the search space of
the binary expansion (44). Specifically, for all t ∈ T , i ∈ Zpi,
and h, k ∈ Kpiti, such that O
m
th < O
m
tk, and P
d
th = P
d
tk, the
following constraint is added:
dwth + d
d
th ≥ D
max
th u
e
tk . (47)
Furthermore, for all t ∈ T , i, j ∈ Zpi, h ∈ Kpiti, and k ∈ K
pi
tj ,
with i 6= j, such that Omth < O
m
tk, P
d
th = P
d
tk, and F
max
tij > 0,
the following constraints are enforced:
ftij ≤ F
max
tij − ǫ
f + uftij (48)
ftij ≥ F
max
tij −M
F
tij(1− u
f
tij) (49)
u
f
tij ∈ {0, 1} (50)
dwth + d
d
th ≥ D
max
th u
e
tk −M
D
thu
f
tij −M
D
thu
f
tji . (51)
Notice that merit orders, prices and maximum flow capac-
ities are inputs, therefore the above constraints are linear.
The term ǫf is a sufficiently small parameter, whereas MFtij
and MDth are appropriate large constants, that are defined
in Appendix A. Constraint (47) enforces the merit order for
ATM orders within the same zone. Furthermore, from (23)
and (48)-(50), uftij = 1 if and only if ftij = F
max
tij , i.e., the
line is congested. Constraint (51) enforces the merit order
for ATM orders in zones directly connected. If the line is
not saturated, then uftij = 0, and the constraint is enforced,
otherwise there is market split and the constraint is deacti-
vated. Constraint (51) can be further generalized to zones
connected through a path involving multiple lines. In this
case, to enforce the constraint, all the variables uftij must be
zero, i.e., the lines connecting the zones i and j must not be
saturated, otherwise there is a market split along the path,
and the merit order must not be enforced. As a remark, no-
tice that a loose formulation of uftij can be implemented by
using:
u
f
tij ≤
ftij + F
max
tji
Fmaxtij + F
max
tji
(52)
instead of (48)-(49). In this case if ftij < F
max
tij , then u
f
tij= 0,
but the converse is not true. This approach appears to be
preferable for dealing with solvers or modeling languages that
do not allow to prioritize the binary variables. Indeed, the
merit order for ATM orders can be regarded as a secondary
requirement, and it should be enforced by the solver only at
the end of the Branch-and-Bound process. This can be per-
formed efficiently by setting the lowest priority to the binary
variables uftij .
5. Numerical Results
This section describes the numerical results obtained by
testing the MILP model introduced in Section 3.4, and re-
ported in Appendix A.
5.1. Experiment setup
The data used to test the proposed MILP model was down-
loaded from the website of the Italian market operator [15].
It refers to the day-ahead market, and covers 31 days, ranging
from January 1st to January 31st, 2018. Each day involves
on average 20,307 demand orders and 37,810 offer orders.
These orders are distributed over 22 zones. Six zones are
the Italian physical zones, which enforce the UPP scheme,
whereas the remaining zones do not enforce the UPP. We
recall that the Italian UPP is termed PUN. Artificial orders
were randomly added to test curtailable profile block orders.
Specifically, for a block order p, the maximum hourly quan-
tity offered SB,maxtp was sampled from a uniform distribution
ranging from 1 MWh to 75 MWh, whereas the block order
price PBp was generated by using a normal distribution with
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Figure 7: Test of the proposed MILP model using real data of the Italian
day-ahead market, from January 1st to January 31st, 2018. The test
involves 744 independent hourly problems. For each instance of the
problem, the figure reports the number of binary variables (bar chart,
left axis), and the computation time (line chart, right axis) to reach the
optimal solution.
mean 50 e/MWh and standard deviation of 10 e/MWh. The
MAR is set to 10%. The MILP model was implemented in
Python 2.7 with Pyomo 5.2 [57], and solved with CPLEX 12.5
[58] on a 8-core 2.40GHz Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2630 v3,
with 32 GB of RAM. The Python code is freely accessible
on GitHub [59], and the documentation of the main func-
tions is available at [60]. The documentation describes also
how to obtain the Italian data from [15]. Orders without a
price limit, listed in the Italian market with a price P dtk= 3000
Euro/MWh, are assumed to be fully executed. The value of
the parameter ǫ in (8) can be set arbitrarily small. Since the
Italian market limits the resolution of the PUN to six digits,
any value not greater than 10−6 is acceptable. The tuning
of the big-M parameters in (7)-(8), and (12) is discussed in
Appendix A.
5.2. Test with real Italian data
The first test takes into account only the real data of the
Italian day-ahead market, which ranges from January 1st to
January 31st, 2018, and includes 1,801,652 market orders.
The purpose is to verify the effectiveness of the proposed ap-
proach in solving the UPP clearing scheme. The test involves
744 hourly PUN problems. On average, each instance of the
problem contains 985 binary variables, and is solved to opti-
mality in 8.74 seconds. In the performed tests, all the cleared
quantities match the real quantities executed on the Italian
market. The binary expansion (44) is actually utilized only
in 9 cases out of 744 (1.21% of the cases). That is, in these
cases the solution contains at least one order with udtk = 1.
Figure 7 reports for each hourly PUN problem the number
of binary variables involved, and the time to reach the op-
timal solution. The largest spikes in the computation time
correspond to the instances where the binary expansion actu-
ally takes place. The maximum time is 74.60 seconds, which
corresponds to the 20th hour of January 24th.
5.3. Test with 50 curtailable profile block orders over 12 hours
The second test involves the data of the Italian market op-
erator referring to January 1st, with the addition of 50 cur-
tailable profile block orders randomly generated as described
in Section 5.1. Each block order spans from the 9th to the
20th hour. To test the effectiveness of the proposed MILP
model, the block orders are evenly distributed between an
PUN zone (Sicily) and a non-PUN zone (Swiss). The pres-
ence of block orders requires to solve a single MILP problem
spanning the whole considered day. The clearing problem
involves 19,246 PUN demand orders, 414 non-UPP demand
orders, 34,927 supply orders, 50 curtailable profile block or-
ders, and is solved in 848.79 seconds.
Table 1 reports the real Italian PUN (second column), and
the PUN obtained from the proposed model (third column).
The shadowed rows correspond to the hours where the block
orders have been added. As can be observed, the difference
between the real and the modeled PUN is zero up to the
fourth decimal place in the hours where the block orders are
not present. This discrepancy is due to the tolerance param-
eter κt in (6), which can lead to slight differences in the PUN,
despite the same matched quantities. By contrast, from the
9th to the 20th hour, the presence of block orders leads to
a decrease in the PUN, which is caused by the additional
quantity supplied by the block orders.
Table 1: Test with real Italian market data and 50 curtailable profile
block orders over 12 hours
Hour PUN (Real) PUN with block orders Difference
(e/MWh) (e/MWh) (e/MWh)
h1 45.822320 45.822277 -0.000043
h2 44.160000 44.159954 -0.000046
h3 42.240000 42.239952 -0.000048
h4 39.290000 39.289950 -0.000050
h5 36.000000 35.999949 -0.000051
h6 41.990000 41.989950 -0.000050
h7 42.250000 42.249953 -0.000047
h8 44.970000 44.969955 -0.000045
h9 45.000000 43.239955 -1.760045
h10 44.940000 43.819958 -1.120042
h11 45.024790 44.643418 -0.381372
h12 45.709640 45.709599 -0.000041
h13 46.700810 45.412933 -1.287877
h14 43.980140 43.652657 -0.327483
h15 44.961410 41.827956 -3.133454
h16 47.532150 45.170423 -2.361727
h17 49.906020 49.199960 -0.706060
h18 54.300000 52.699966 -1.600034
h19 51.910000 50.329967 -1.580033
h20 51.380000 50.069968 -1.310032
h21 49.200000 49.199967 -0.000033
h22 45.730000 45.729965 -0.000035
h23 44.840000 44.839962 -0.000038
h24 38.110000 38.109958 -0.000042
Table 2 reports the surplus of each block order and the
acceptance ratio rp. All the block orders with a positive
surplus, i.e., the ITM block orders, are fully cleared (rp= 1).
The block orders with a negative surplus, i.e., the OTM block
orders, are correctly rejected (rp= 0). Furthermore, notice
that block order 15 in the PUN zone has zero surplus (see
the corresponding row in the left part of Table 2). That is,
it is an ATM block order, and it is partially cleared with
rp= 0.86.
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Table 2: Surplus and acceptance ratio of the 50 curtailable profile block
orders over 12 hours
PUN zone non-PUN zone
Block order rp Surplus Block order rp Surplus
# 1 1 757.71 # 1 0 -6006.43
# 2 0 -3189.49 # 2 1 1595.23
# 3 1 1734.14 # 3 0 -860.09
# 4 0 -798.90 # 4 1 1588.19
# 5 0 -1240.37 # 5 1 3955.22
# 6 0 -8509.20 # 6 0 -2752.53
# 7 1 1103.28 # 7 1 2009.12
# 8 1 2823.18 # 8 0 -8152.57
# 9 0 -1227.17 # 9 0 -1243.52
# 10 0 -4390.73 # 10 0 -1014.00
# 11 1 3670.59 # 11 1 375.30
# 12 0 -4164.72 # 12 0 -7096.47
# 13 0 -4077.12 # 13 0 -5852.56
# 14 1 2050.83 # 14 0 -2750.48
# 15 0.86 0.00 # 15 0 -5519.35
# 16 1 9032.51 # 16 0 -2426.21
# 17 1 1892.57 # 17 0 -1250.19
# 18 1 130.61 # 18 1 3851.04
# 19 1 1695.72 # 19 0 -4958.88
# 20 0 -170.42 # 20 0 -191.22
# 21 0 -2345.83 # 21 1 805.30
# 22 0 -4060.25 # 22 0 -13577.37
# 23 0 -10139.95 # 23 1 3728.25
# 24 0 -1043.00 # 24 0 -11281.57
# 25 0 -3251.99 # 25 0 -3678.96
6. Conclusions
The coupling of all the European electricity markets is an
ongoing process which faces several difficulties. In particular,
the presence of heterogeneous orders and rules, such as block
orders and the uniform purchase price, rises several issues.
The proposed mixed-integer linear program allows one to
solve the market clearing problem in the presence of both cur-
tailable profile block orders and the uniform purchase price
scheme. In particular, it harmonizes within a unique opti-
mization program two classes of heterogeneous orders and
rules. An exact social welfare maximization problem is for-
mulated and solved, as required by European guidelines. The
proposed approach is non-iterative, heuristic-free, and the
solution is exact, with no approximation up to the level of
resolution of current market data. In addition, the solution
is obtained coherently with the marginal pricing framework.
Finally, the mixed-integer linear program formulation allows
one to prove the optimality of the obtained solution.
Ongoing work aims at introducing linked block orders,
piecewise linear orders, and complex orders (as the Iberian
minimum income condition) in the proposed framework. It
is expected that the income condition could be modeled in a
similar way as the surplus of the block order. By contrast,
piecewise linear orders will pose additional issues, due to the
presence of quadratic terms in the objective function.
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Appendix A. The final MILP model
The objective function of the final MILP model is defined
in (28), whereas the problem’s constraints are:
∑
k∈Kpit
y
gpi
tk D
max
tk +
∑
k∈Kpit
P dtkd
d
tk =
∑
i∈Zpi
∑
k∈Kpi
ti
y
gζ
tkiD
max
tk
−
∑
k∈Kpit
y
wϕ
tk D
max
tk + 10
−c
∑
i∈Zpi
J∑
j=0
y
bζ
tij2
j + κt ∀t ∈ T
(A.1)
∑
t∈T
∑
k∈K
ζ
t
P dtkd
ζ
tk +
∑
t∈T
∑
k∈Kpit
P dtkd
w
tk
−
∑
k∈Kt
∑
p∈Pt
P stpstp −
∑
p∈PB
∑
t∈Tp
PBp rpS
B,max
tp
=
∑
t∈T
∑
k∈Kpit
y
wϕ
tk D
max
tk +
∑
t∈T
∑
k∈K
ζ
t
ϕ
ζ
tkD
max
tk +
∑
t∈T
∑
p∈Pt
ϕstpS
max
tp
+
∑
t∈T
∑
i∈Z
∑
j∈Z
δmaxtij F
max
tij −
∑
t∈T
∑
i∈Zpi
∑
k∈Kpi
ti
y
gζ
tkiD
max
tk
− 10−c
∑
t∈T
∑
i∈Zpi
J∑
j=0
y
bζ
tij2
j
+
∑
p∈PB
yBϕ,maxp −
∑
p∈PB
yBϕ,minp R
min
p (A.2)
(7)-(8) (A.3)
uetkP
d
tk − y
epi
tk = 0 ∀t ∈ T , ∀k ∈ K
pi
t (A.4)
(10)-(17) (A.5)
(19)-(27) (A.6)
(30)-(34) (A.7)
(44) , (A.8)
where the auxiliary variables are defined as follows:
−Mpiugtk ≤ y
gpi
tk ≤M
piu
g
tk (A.9)
−Mpi(1− ugtk) ≤ π − y
gpi
tk ≤M
pi(1− ugtk) (A.10)
−Mpiuetk ≤ y
epi
tk ≤M
piuetk (A.11)
−Mpi(1− uetk) ≤ π − y
epi
tk ≤M
pi(1− uetk) (A.12)
0 ≤ ywϕtk ≤M
piuwtk (A.13)
0 ≤ ϕwtk − y
wϕ
tk ≤M
pi(1− uwtk) , (A.14)
with t ∈ T , k ∈ Kpit ;
−Mpiugtk ≤ y
gζ
tki ≤M
piu
g
tk (A.15)
−Mpi(1 − ugtk) ≤ ζti − y
gζ
tki ≤M
pi(1− ugtk) , (A.16)
with t ∈ T , i ∈ Zpi, k ∈ Kpiti;
−Mpibtji ≤ y
bζ
tij ≤M
pibtji (A.17)
−Mpi(1− btji) ≤ ζti − y
bζ
tij ≤M
pi(1− btji) , (A.18)
with t ∈ T , i ∈ Zpi, j ∈ {0, . . . , J}, where J is an appropriate
parameter depending on market data;
0 ≤ yBϕ,maxp ≤M
B
p u
B
p (A.19)
0 ≤ ϕB,maxp − y
Bϕ,max
p ≤M
B
p (1− u
B
p ) (A.20)
0 ≤ yBϕ,minp ≤M
B
p u
B
p (A.21)
0 ≤ ϕB,minp − y
Bϕ,min
p ≤M
B
p (1 − u
B
p ) , (A.22)
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with p ∈ PB.
In (8) the value of ǫ is 10−8, whereas in (48) the value
of ǫf is 10−6. In the Italian market, the maximum price
Mpi, used in (7)-(8) and (A.9)-(A.18), is 3000 Euro/MWh.
Moreover, considering that block orders span over multiple
hours, the value of MBp in (12) and (A.19)-(A.22) is set to
Mpi
∑
t∈Tp
S
B,max
tp . In (49) the parameter M
F
tij is defined as
MFtij = F
max
tij + F
max
tji , whereas in (51) the parameter M
D
th is
defined as MDth = D
max
th .
Furthermore, in order to reduce significantly the search
space of the upper level binary variables, the following con-
straint can be implemented:
uetk ≤ u
g
th − u
g
tk ∀t ∈ T , ∀h, k ∈ K
pi
t , (A.23)
such that P dth > P
d
tk.
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